ABSTRACT Mobile communications (e.g., emails, Snapchat and Facebook) over a wireless connection is a norm in our Internet-connected society. Ensuring the security of communications between devices is an ongoing challenge. A number of authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have been proposed to verify the authenticity of a user and the integrity of messages sent over an insecure wireless communication channel. Recently, Tsai et al. proposed two AKE protocols designed for wireless network systems. In this paper, we demonstrate that their protocols are vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks through presenting concrete attacks, contrary to their claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring the security of mobile communications remains a topic of ongoing interest. Examples of threats to mobile communications include eavesdropping, modification, replaying and delaying of message transmission. Cryptographic techniques, and in particular encryption, are generally used to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of messages. However, conventional cryptographic techniques (data-atrest encryption) are not suitable for deployment on mobile devices (e.g. Android and iOS devices) due to bandwidth, computational, and storage limitations.
One popular research trend is designing secure key exchange schemes (e.g. authenticated key exchange protocols) that are sufficiently lightweight for wireless network and mobile environment deployment. An authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol allows users to authenticate each other and securely exchange a common key for subsequent communication.
Since the seminal work of Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [1] , a large number of AKE protocols have been proposed in the literature. For example, Abdalla et al. presented a three-party password authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocol [2] for wireless mobile communications. Their scheme utilizes a trusted three-party server to authenticate the users prior to the exchange of session keys. Lu and Cao introduced a S-3PAKE protocol [3] , but was later shown by Chung and Ku [4] to be vulnerable to impersonation attack. Guo et al [5] alse demonstrated that the improved protocol of Chung and Ku' protocol [4] is not secure against both impersonation and replay attack. Chang et al. [6] presented a protocol that does not require a server public key or symmetric cryptosystems. However, Yoon and Yoo [7] demonstrated that these protocols are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks, such as undetectble online-dictionary attacks and off-line password guessing attacks.
The ability to exchange only one session key per round limits the application of AKE protocol in a wireless mobile network. Thus, the need for multi-key exchange protocols which as the name suggests allow multiple keys to be exchanged in each round.
Wenmin et al presented a three-party passwordauthenticated multiple key exchange protocol(3MPAKE) [8] . Tsai et al. [9] subsequently designed a trusted-third-partybased high-efficient multi-key exchange protocol(THMEP) based on the protocol of Li et al. and claimed that the protocol achieves both mutual authentication and key exchange. In this paper, we revisit both protocols and demonstrate that both protocols are insecure against off-line password guessing attacks.
The notations used in this paper are presented in As shown in Fig. 1 , we review Tsai et al. 's first protocol [9] (3MPAKE) as follow.
The trusted server S generates the system parameters {G, P, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , F}, and then publishes them. 
User B carries out the steps similarly as follow: (2.1b) Produce three random numbers x B1 , x B2 and k B where 
and i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. F is a secure pseudo-random function.
Simultaneously, upon gaining {ID S , ID A , Z B1 , Z B2 , τ B } from server S, user B carries out the steps as follow:
; if the equation is not satisfied, user B will terminate this session. Otherwise, it will; (4.3b)
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF TSAI et al. 's FIRST PROTOCOL
In an off-line password guessing attack, the condition of success is that enough messages can be utilized to verify whether or not the guessed password is correct. Tsai et al.'s first protocol (3MPAKE) claimed that it have highter reliability than other 3PAKE protocols. However, in this part, we will demonstrate that 3MPAKE protocol cannot resist the off-line password guessing attack. As shown in Fig. 2 , our attack scheme consists of four phases. 
1) FIRST PHASE
Adversary A does the steps as follow:
1) Generate a random number s A ∈ Z * n ; 2) Compute S * A = s A P; 3) Deliver {ID S , S * A } to A.
2) SECOND PHASE
User A carries out the steps as follow:
3) THIRD PHASE
When receiving {ID A , X A1 , X A2 , r A , y A }, the adversary A executes the steps as follow: 1) Guess the password pw A of user A from the password space D;
2)
3) Verify xR A mod n ≡ r A . If the equation is satisfied, the adversary A holds the password pw A . Otherwise, adversary A repeats the steps 1), 2) and 3) until getting the correct password of user A; 4) When finding the correct password pw A , adversary A produces two random numbers x C1 and x C2 ∈ Z * n ;
4) FOURTH PHASE
Upon recieving {ID S , ID B , Z A1 , Z A2 , τ A }, user A carries out the steps as follow: 
After that, the adversary
A (e A P + r A V A ) and verifies whether or not xR A mod n ≡ r A . If it does hold, the adversary holds pw A and K AS . Otherwise, adversary A repeats the steps until getting the correct password.
Theorem 2: In attack, the adversary and user A/B can produce common session keys.
Proof: The adversary A computes Z A1 ≡ sX C1 ; Z A2 ≡ sX C2 ; Z C1 ≡ sX A1 ; Z C2 ≡ sX A2 , and delivers messages Z A1 , Z A2 to user A. When recieving the massages, user A calculates from left to right and adversary calculates from right to left as follow:
(
Then, adversary and user A calculate the same session keys SK i , in which SK i = F K i (ID A , ID S , ID B ) . We can alse proof that the same session keys can be produced by adversary and user B using the similar steps.
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According to above content, we discover that the adversary holds session keys of user A and user B respectively. Then, the adversary secretly relays and possibly alters the communication between user A and B who believe that they are directly communicating with each other. Thus, we successfully prove Tsai et al.'s first protocol (3MPAKE) is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack.
III. REVIEW AND SECURITY ANALYSIS OF TSAI et al.'s SECOND PROTOCOL A. REVIEW OF TSAI et al. 's SECOND PROTOCOL
Tsai et al.'s second protocol [9] (THMEP) has four rounds. As shown in Fig. 3 , we review them as follow.
The trusted server S generates the system parameters {G, P, H 1 }, and then publishes them.
Round 1:
The trusted server S carries out the steps as follow:
(1) Fetch its time t nonce,S and compute k CT = H 2 (t nonce,S ); (2) Generate random numbers s A ,s B ∈ Z * n ; 
(5) Verify whether or not S A,C = S A ; if the equation is not satisfied, it will terminate this session. Otherwise, it will (6) Produce a random number x A ∈ Z * n ; 
(2) Verify X A,C ≡ X A ; if the equation is not satisfied, server S will terminate this session. Otherwise, it will (3) Compute x B,C and X B,C using the similar equations as (1) 
Similarly, user B carries out the steps as follow:
(2) Verify η B,C = η B ; if the equation is not satisfied, user B will terminate this session. Otherwise,it will (3)
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF TSAI et al. 's SECOND PROTOCOL
Tsai et al.'s second protocol claimed that THMEP provides mutual authentication and can resist eavesdropping, impersonation, forgery, replay and known-key attacks. However, in this section, we will indicate that Tsai et al.'s second protocol (THMEP) cannot resist the off-line password guessing attack. As shown in Fig. 4 , attack consists of three phases.
1) FIRST PHASE
When recieving {ID S , t nonce,S , s A , S A } from server S, user A carries out the steps as follow:
(1) Check t nonce,S and S A,C ; (2) Compute and verify
Similarly, user B carries out the same steps. Then, user B delivers {ID S , t nonce,S , s B , S B } to server S. 
2) SECOND PHASE
Adversary A executes the steps as follow:
(1) Eavesdroping on the communications, adversary A receives {ID S , t nonce,S , s A , S A }, {ID S , t nonce,S , s B , S B }, {ID A , x A , X A } and {ID B , x B , X B }. Adversary A blocks the communications (2) Guess the password pw A of user A from the password space D, and derive the password key k PWA from pw A .
(4) Verify whether or not S A = S A . If the equation is satisfied, the adversary gets the correct password pw A . Otherwise, A repeats 1), 2) 3) and 4) untile finding the correct password.
(5) Guess the password pw B in the same steps. Let's omit this redundant portion from this paper.
(6) when finding the correct password pw A and pw B , adversary A computes s A , s B ;
Produce two random numbers x C , s C ∈ Z * n ; 
3) THIRD PHASE
Adversary A calculates session key of user A as follow:
Adversary A calculates session key of user B as follow: 
Afterwards, the adversary A calculates S A = s A P and verifies whether or not S A = S A . If the equation is satisfied, the adversary A holds the correct password pw A and secret massage s A .Then, the adversary A uses the same way to guess pw B and hold secret massage s B . After that, adversary A can carry out the next phase of attack.
Theorem 2: In attack, the adversary and user A/B can produce the same session keys.
Proof: The adversary A computes X C = x C P; S C = s C P and delivers X C , S C to A and X C , S C to B. When recieving the massages, user A calculates from left to right and adversary A calculates from right to left as follow.
Then, The adversary A and user A hold the same session keys SK t = (K i + 2 K j ) ⊕ K k . User B's computational process is similar.
According to the three phases attack, the adversary produces the same session keys with user A and B. Thus, Tsai et al.'s second protocol [9] cannot resist such attack.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reviewed Tsai et al.'s [9] 
